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Abstract 
The study examines the causal link between the anti-graft agencies practices and good governance in Nigeria. We 
employed purposive sampling technique where 400 copies of questionnaires were distributed to professional 
accountants, bankers, journalist and lawyers. The data collected were analysed using both descriptive and 
inferential statistics. We seek to find out if there exist, significant or causal relationship between our exogenous 
variable, antigraft agencies practices, proxied by admin/professional etiquette (LAPE) and Efficiency on 
prosecution and obedience to the rule of law (LEPL); and our endogenous variable, good governance(LGGP). By 
using autoregressive distributed lag approach (ARDL) and Granger causality test, we aim at establishing which of 
our exogenous variable has significant or causal effect on good governance in Nigeria. The analysis of the 
outcomes led to the conclusion that none of our exogenous variable has significant relationship with good 
governance but though, there exist a uni-directional causality from admin/professional etiquette to good 
governance practices.  The study also revealed the existence of a long run relationship among the variables under 
study. The study recommends amendment of the extant laws establishing the anti-graft agencies for operational 
efficiency in prosecution, responsiveness to the constitution and adequate training for officials in order for the 
Nigerian state to benefit maximally from these agencies.      
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1. Introduction 
The consequence of corruption in the society is the erosion of scarce resources earmarked for infrastructural 
development as the funds are siphoned to private pockets. Efficiency is traded for waste and ethnicity, excellence 
for mediocrity, hard work for lousiness as a result, in spite of the enormous human and natural resources the 
country is still grouped under the poorest countries of the world.  
The Nigerian state has witnessed exponential increase in corruption right from the Second Republic as that 
was the excuse given by the military to overthrow the Second Republic government. However, the military 
administration did not eliminate the cancer of corruption rather the administration inflamed it. The country’s image 
internationally since then, has been on a downward spiral lane where Transparency International in 2018 ranked 
Nigeria as 148th most corrupt country in their Corruption Perception Index (CPI). This perception has a negative 
effect on Nigerians travelling abroad as well as cost of doing business internationally.  
As governance is about the process of making and implementing decisions, governance practices are the 
panacea for politico-economic growth of a nation. The presence of efficient and effective management of resources 
thus enhances development. Good governance is not all about making ‘correct’ decisions, but about the best 
possible process for making those decisions in a transparent manner devoid of personal interest.  
As corruption is the use of official authority in taking decisions that are for private gains devoid of 
transparency, successive governments in Nigeria in order to curb corruption and enshrine good decision-making 
processes and good governance, established various anti-graft agencies to curb the menace which has become a 
cancer in the fibre of the Nigerian nation. As good governance and operational practice should among others be 
participatory, effective and efficient in service delivery, equitable, inclusive, responsive, and transparent and 
following the rule of law, this paper is to evaluate the anti-graft agencies operational effectiveness and their 
governance practices in comparison with other international anti-graft agencies. 
The objective of the paper is to appraise the operational effectiveness of the anti-graft agencies in the prisms 
of good governance and operational practices mechanism of participatory, effective and efficient service delivery, 
equitable and inclusive, responsive, transparent and following the rule of law. Ascertain whether board size 
composition, operational reporting channel, prerequisite qualification for the leadership, inter-agency 
collaboration and operations methodology influences its efficiency in service delivery and decision making 
processes in comparison with other international anti-graft agencies. Also check for existence of causal 
relationship among the variables used for this study 
  
 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)  
Vol.11, No.10, 2020 
 
37 
1.1 Research hypothesis 
H01: There is no significant relationship between anti-graft agencies prosecution efficiencies/ obedience to the rule 
of law and good governance practices 
H02: There is no significant relationship between anti-graft agencies administrative/professional etiquette and good 
governance practices 
H03: There is no causal relationship between anti-graft agencies prosecution efficiencies/ obedience to the rule of 
law and their administrative/professional etiquette and good governance practices 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1.The Code of Conduct Bureau 
The Code of Conduct Bureau and its twin sister, the Code of Conduct Tribunal was set up under the Code of 
Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, Cap 56, LFN 1990. The Board was set up against the backdrop of large-scale 
fraud and corruption which has become prevalent in the public service with an inimical effect on economic and 
social development of the country. The Commission has as its mandate to establish and maintain a high standard 
of public morality in the conduct of government businesses and to ensure that the actions and behavior of public 
officers conform to the highest standards of public morality and accountability. The Commission’s Vision is 
honesty, transparency and accountability.   
 
2.1.Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU). 
The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit is the Nigerian arm of the global financial intelligence Units (FIUs). It 
was initially a unit under the control and direction of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC). It 
has as its vision statement to be amongst the leading financial intelligence organizations in the world with a mission 
to safeguarding the Nigerian financial system and contributing to the global fight against money laundering, 
terrorism financing and related crimes through the provision of credible financial intelligence. The core mandate 
of NFIU is to serve as the national center for the receipt and analysis of suspicious transactions and other 
information relevant to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing and for the 
dissemination of the results of the analysis to law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies.  
 
2.3.Economic and Financial Crime Commission 
The Economic and Financial Crime Commission is established under the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (Establishment) Act 2002.The Commission’s responsibilities include the investigation, coordination 
and enforcement of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering, contract scam etc and the 
adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze, confiscate or seize proceeds derived from terrorists activities, 
economic and financial crimes related offences or the properties the value of which corresponds to such proceeds. 
The Act stipulates the Chairman who is the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer to be either a serving or 
retired member of any government security or law enforcement agency and 20 other members drawn from various 
security agencies.  
 
2.4.Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act (2004) 
The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) is established through the Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Act (2004). The objective of its establishment is to prohibit and prescribe punishment for corrupt 
practices and other related offences and is saddled with the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting offences 
which are listed in the Act. The Board composition consist of the Chairman who would have held or is qualified 
to hold office as a judge of a superior court of record in Nigeria and twelve (12) other members. The Act empowers 
the Commission to receive and investigate complaints and prosecute offenders. Also the Act empowers the 
Commission to in addition educate the general public on and against bribery, corruption and related offences; and 
enlist and foster public support in combating corruption. 
 
2.5.The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
The Agency is one of the investigative agencies in the United States. It reports to the Department of Justice and 
operate independently from the Presidency. The Agency is headed by a Director who is a legal practitioner 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the US Senate from outside the service. The Agency’s Mission 
Statement as its culture is the; rigorous obedience to the constitution of the United States, respect for the dignity 
of those it protects, compassion, fairness, uncompromising personal integrity and institutional integrity, 
accountability by accepting responsibility for the actions or decisions of its employees and leadership both personal 
and professional. The culture statement thus captures the governance framework upon which the agency operates. 
It has as its motto: Fidelity, Bravery and Integrity. To achieve its vision and mission, the agency’s area of 
investigation includes; terrorism, counter intelligence, cyber-crime, public corruption, civil rights, organized 
crimes, white-collar crimes, violent crimes and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To accomplish the mission 
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of integrity, fidelity and bravery, the agency renders Criminal Justice Information Service (CJIS), Critical Incident 
Response Group (CIRG), Laboratory Service, Training academy, operational technology and information 
management. The agency maintains a robust uniform crime reporting program (UCR) with primary objective of 
generating reliable information for use in law enforcement administration, operation and management. This 
program facilitates retrieval of information on crime in the US for law enforcement executives, students of criminal 
justice, researchers, members of the media and the public at large. This facility enhances quality of crime data 
collected by law enforcement thus improves inter-agency synergy, data sharing and co-operation.  
Serious Fraud Office 
Due to considerable public dissatisfaction with the UK system for investigating and prosecuting serious or 
complex fraud, the Serious Fraud Office was established in 1988 following the Roskill Report (Fraud Trials 
Committee) recommendation. The office as part of UK criminal justice system is a specialist prosecuting authority 
tackling the top level of serious or complex fraud, bribery and corruption cases in the UK. It undertakes large 
economic crime cases by investigating any suspected offence which appears to her on reasonable grounds to 
involve serious or complex fraud. Also investigates criminals for the financial benefits they may have made from 
their crimes and assist overseas jurisdiction with their investigations into serious and complex fraud, bribery and 
corruption cases as additions to investigating and prosecuting offences of corporate failure to prevent the 
facilitation of overseas tax evasion. Unlike other agencies, the agency both investigate and prosecute its cases 
because of the complexity of the cases assigned to it. The agency is headed by a Director who is responsible for 
overall responsibility for the SFO’s strategic direction, case decisions and organisational management. While the 
Chief Operating Officer is responsible for the day to day running of the business and deputies for the DSFO, the 
General Counsel role is to provide oversight advice and quality control on the agency’s case development and trial 
preparation.  
The three non-executive directors in the board contribute to the agency’s strategic development and providing 
constructive challenge. The Agency reports to the Attorney General’s office and work in collaboration with other 
UK law enforcement agencies like the National Crime Agency’s Economic command, international corruption 
unit and bribery and corruption intelligence unit. Also the City of London Police, the UK Police forces and regional 
organised crime units, the HM Revenue and Customs and the Financial Conduct Authority. Over 80% of staff are 
specialist caseworkers and where the director believes there are reasonable grounds to suspect complex or serious 
fraud, bribery or corruption, she opens an investigation which is taken on by a multidisciplinary case team. If 
sufficient evidence of criminal behaviour is uncovered during the investigation and a prosecution is found to be in 
the public interest, charges will be brought. This methodology has greatly enhanced the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the agency’s cases prosecutions.  
 
2.6.Governance practice and Graft. 
Governance is the medium of administering a people for the overall good of the society. There are various means 
of governance in both the public and private sectors. Governance ranges from dictatorial autocratic to participatory 
governance. Governance can be adjudged good or bad governance. Accountability is bedrock of good governance 
and in the public sector, government agencies officials have an obligation to report, explain and be answerable for 
the consequences of decisions they make on behalf of the citizenry. Good governance therefore should exhibit 
openness, participatory, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, responsive, transparent and compliance to 
the rule of law.  
Board effectiveness and efficiency has also been attributed to board composition and quality of board 
members. Studies have attributed the effectiveness of a group decision making process decreases as the size of the 
group get larger. The opined the optimum size for a decision-making group to be seven people and that for each 
person added above this, the group decision making effectiveness is reduced by 10% (Blenko, Mankins and 
Rogers). Margolis & Sheila (2011) posit that other studies found that the most effective number in the board to be 
five but noted that the most effective of the group decision making is between five and eight, (Margolis & Sheila, 
2011). 
The public sector plays a major role in society as public sector expenditure forms a significant part of nation’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and public sector entities are major employers of labour, its operations 
significantly influences socio-economic growth and development. To promote a robust governance structure, the 
International Public Sector Governance Framework was developed jointly by the Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) and the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC).  
 
2.7.Aim of the International Public Sector Governance Framework  
The aim of the framework is to promote the development of robust governance by establishing a benchmark for 
good governance in the public sector thus encouraging better service delivery and improved accountability. The 
framework is anchored on six key principles of good governance of ensuring agencies act in the public interest at 
all times. These include; Strong commitment to integrity, ethical values and the rule of laws, openness and 
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comprehensive stakeholder engagement, defining outcomes in terms of sustainable economic, social and 
environmental benefits, determining the interventions necessary to optimise the achievement of intended outcomes, 
developing the capacity of the agencies which include the capability of its leadership and the individuals within it 
through training, managing risks and performance through robust internal control and strong public financial 
management and implementing good practices in transparency and reporting to deliver effective accountability. 
Demonstrating integrity involves the leadership promoting a culture of acting in the public interest at all times 
by taking the lead in establishing and living up to specific values for the agencies and their staff. These values 
include objectivity, selflessness and honesty. They reflect the public expectations about the conduct and behaviour 
of agencies and people who manage public services and spend public funds. Similarly, strong commitment to 
ethical values involves embedding ethical values and standards throughout the agencies and ensuring the values 
form the basis for all its policies, procedures and actions as well as the personal behaviour of the agencies 
managements and staff. This is through the establishment of code of conduct policy for management and staff and 
ensuring that steps are taken to avoid or deal with any conflict of interest whether real or perceived. Also, the 
framework requires anti-graft agencies as public sector entities and its staff to demonstrate a strong commitment 
to the rule of law as well as compliance with all relevant laws. This is important as fair legal process, rooted on an 
impartial as well as an independent judicial system assist in building societies where individuals and organisations 
feel safe. This informed the crafting of the United States FBI Mission statement. 
 
2.8.Corruption in Nigeria 
Corruption has grown in leaps and bounds since the Ibrahim Badamosi Babagida’s era as military President of 
Nigeria when the expression, “settlement” was coined as a synonym for corrupt practices by the general public. 
The country’s image since then has been on a downward spiral lane. In their ranking in 2018, Transparency 
International Nigeria ranked Nigeria as 148th most corrupt country in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI).  
Various scholars have defined corruption in different ways with overlapping emphasise ranging from 
unethical behaviour to political misconduct, bribe-taking and sale of government assets for personal gain (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993 & Svensson, 2005) as cited in Ewa, Adesola and Kankpang(2019). World Bank and 
Transparency International (TI) defined corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gain. Thus it is the 
misapplication of entrusted power for personal gain by dishonest official either appointed or elected official, (The 
World Bank, 1997A). In their contribution, Banerjee, Hanna and Mullainathan (2011) define corruption as “an 
incident where a bureaucrat (or an elected official) breaks a rule for private gain‟. Tanzi (1998) opined that it may 
not be easy to define corruption but is “generally not difficult to recognize corruption when observed”. According 
to Ewa, Kechi,; Adu and Agida,(2017),  the misuse of entrusted authority comes in form of bribery, 
misappropriation, misapplication of entrusted funds and property of the organisation or the public for personal use 
and suppressing the rule of law for selfish reasons. Ewa et al (2017) posited that corruption is the “abuse of public 
power for pecuniary gain or for the benefit of a group to which an individual owes allegiance”. While premeditating 
factors rooted in a country’s peculiar social and cultural history, political and economic development, bureaucratic 
traditions and policies enhances corruption, it flourishes when institutions are either weak or non-existent and 
economic policies distort the marketplace (World Bank, 1997b). Klitgaard (1996) developed a model which 
explained that the extent of corruption is determined by the amount of monopolistic and discretionary powers 
(ability to take responsibility solely without external check) that officials exercises without recourse to 
accountability.  
C (Corruption) = M (Monopoly power) + D(Discretion) - A(Accountability)  
In explaining the model, he stated that monopolistic and discretionary powers are prevalent where 
administrative rules and regulations are poorly defined. That is, poorly defined ethical standards, weak 
administrative and financial systems and ineffective watchdog agencies.  
 
3.Research methodology 
This study adopted both exploratory and survey design to collect the data on the study’s variables, analyse and 
testing.  
 
3.1Characteristics of participants 
A combination of inductive and survey research paradigm was employed in this research. The questionnaire used 
in this study consisted of two sections. The first section collected demographic data. The second section contained 
twelve (12) semantic differential belief statements culled from good governance framework variables. Two 
performance indices were measured by these belief statements – (1) obedience to the rule of law, (2) efficiency in 
prosecution and decision usefulness. The statements were structured as bipolar adjectival statements which were 
separated by five – point likert scales aimed at ensuring that respondents would choose a number from the scale 
which identified their level of agreement with one or the other of the statements. The population of the study 
comprised professional accountants, bankers, journalists and lawyers in Cross River State, Akwa Ibom State, Edo 
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State, Bayelsa State, Delta State and Rivers State representing the South-South geopolitical region of Nigeria.  
 
3.2Sample procedure/sampling size 
The purposive sampling technique was employed in the study as 400 copies of questionnaires were distributed to 
100 professional accountants, 100 bankers, 100 journalist and 100 lawyers. The belief statements (variables) were 
individually evaluated in other of significance to ascertain the anti-graft agencies governance practices and their 
success rate in curbing corruption in Nigeria. The data collected were analyzed using both descriptive and 
inferential statistics. Four hundred questionnaires were administered to the respondents in the study. Three hundred 
and fifty questionnaires were returned completed constituting 80% (eighty per cent) success rate. This return rate 
of 80% is considered adequate following the assertion by Moser and Kalton (1971) that the result of a survey could 
be considered as biased and of little value if the return rate was lower than 30 – 40%. Here the return rate of 80% 
is far in excess of 40%.  
 
3.3Model Specification 
The functional relationship between the variables using their log transformation is expressed thus: 
LGGP = f(LAPE, LEPL) 
LGGP  =  α0 + α1 LAPE + α2 LEPL + et 
Where; 
LGGP =  Good Governance Practices 
LEPL =  Efficiency on prosecution and Obedience to the rule of law 
LAPE = Admin/Professional etiquette 
β0   = Constant 
α1- α2  = Coefficient of the variables 
µt   = Stochastic error term 
 
 
4.Results and findings 
4.1Demographics of respondents 
The survey document was sent to 400 subjects containing of 10 belief statements from each of respondent groups. 
An overall response rate of 88% was recorded from the survey as per. This rate is considered a creditable result 
for this type of data collection method. 
Table 1: Responses of the Respondents on the belief Statements: 
S/N Statements SA A U D SD 
SECTION A: DEPENDENT VARIABLE               Good Governance Practices(GGP) 
1 The agencies are not responsive to the 
yearnings of the public in the discharge 
of their responsibilities 
165(47%) 115(33%) 51(15%) 19(5%)  
2 The agencies activities are open to the 
public and interact with the public often 
  91(26%) 159(45%) 100(28%) 
3 The agencies carry out their assignment 
not in a transparent manner 
155(44%) 157(45%) 26(7%) 12(3%)  
4 The agencies do not treat every suspect 
equally no matter your political 
affiliation and status(ie equitable 
and inclusive) 
116(33%) 180(51%) 31(9%) 23(7%)  
5 The agencies line of reporting do not 
influence their decision making 
  111(32%) 190(54%) 49(14%) 
SECTION B: B1   Administrative/Professional Etiquette(APE) 
6 The agencies staff are not well trained 
and they are effective and efficient in the 
discharge of their duty 
127(36%) 89(25%) 74(21%) 54(15%) 6(2%) 
7 The laws setting up the agencies are not 
standard and operatives are not fully 
aware of the laws 
102(29%) 107(30%) 79(22%) 62(18%)  
8 The composition of the agency boards is 
not moderate 
115(33%) 75(21%) 76(22%) 62(18%) 22(6%) 
9 No knowledge of good governance 
criteria 
102(29%) 81(23%) 110(31%) 57(16%)  
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S/N Statements SA A U D SD 
SECTION B: B2      Prosecution Efficiency/Obedience to the rule of law(EPL) 
10 The agencies performances in obedience 
to the rule of law is not outstanding 
100(28%) 155(44%) 76(22%) 19(5%)  
11 The agencies management is loyal to the 
Constitution than the President 
   283(80%) 67(19%) 
12 The agencies performance creditably is 
questionable by the public 
112(32%) 105(30%) 87(25%) 46(13%)  
Source: Analysis of Survey Data, Authors computation (2018) 
From our findings in table 1 above: The notion of Anti-graft none responsiveness to the yearnings of the 
public in the discharge of their responsibilities revealed 280 (80 per cent) respondents affirm the view of not 
responsive to the public yearnings. This is in agreement with (Adedokun, 2018; Yakubu, 2018).  
On the notion of the agencies interactions with the public, 259 (74 per cent) respondents either strongly 
disagreed or merely disagreed that the agencies are interactive with the public. However, 91 (26 per cent) of the 
respondents were undecided on the notion. They belief the agencies are not telling the people the correct situation 
of things and they are not communicating to the general public as it is in developed countries. This none 
communication with the public reinforced the notion that the agencies are not transparent in their responsibilities 
as 312 (89 per cent) of the respondents either merely or strongly agreed that the agencies do not carry out their 
assignment in a transparent manner. This is in agreement with the position of Justice Gabriel Kolawole, (Madukwe, 
2018; Nnochiri, 2018; Adedokun, 2018). This is reaffirmed as 296 (84 per cent) of the respondents belief the 
agencies do not treat suspects equally but influenced by political affiliation. This assertion is in agreement to Fabiyi 
& Akinkuotu (2018) who cited opposition People Democratic Party (PDP) secretary, Mr Kola Ologbodiyan as 
saying it is a grave concern that while corruption and corrupt persons abound in APC and walking freely, the 
EFCC prefers to chase after innocent members of the opposition. Writing on “Kemi Adeosun and the opportunity 
lost”, Adedokun (2018) observed that the message that the anti-graft agencies passed across to the public in 
Nigerians is that they only serve the interest of the government in power and not that of the people and a 
“partisanship that ignores the log in the eye of a family member but identifies the speck in the neighbor’s eye as 
the policy is not only faulty but whimsical and selective”. This is in contrast to the attitude of intelligence agencies 
in other parts of the world like Israel, America or Europe.  
On the line of reporting influencing agencies decision making processes, while 32 per cent respondents were 
undecided, 68 per cent belief the agencies line of reporting to the presidency greatly influences their decision 
making processes. This is in agreement with (Adedokun, 2018; Olatunji (2018b); Akinkuotu & Olugbemi, 2018). 
The overbearing control of anti-graft agencies by government especially the executive arm is considered a 
corruption impediment to their effectiveness, (Okeshola, F. B., 2012) 
On training, while 61 per cent respondents belief the staff are not well trained, 21 per cent were unable to 
comment on the relevance and adequacy of training given to the agency staff. This is in agreement with Nnochiri 
(2018) citing a prosecution team lawyer in a case between Mr. Ibrahim Tumsah and the Federal government stating 
the government was withdrawing the case against Tumsah for re-filing after “proper and thorough investigation” 
is conducted in the case. Also Olatunji (2018a) citing Justice Olatokunbo Majekodunmi stated that the EFCC failed 
woefully by relying on third party evidence that lacks in merit when they should have known better. 
On standardize laws in operation, 59 per cent belief the current laws of the agencies are not standard and the 
operatives are not fully aware of the laws. This collaborates Adeleye Bamidele cited by Jibueze (2018) who stated 
that Nigeria lacks strong institutions and there is absence of the rule of law in Nigeria  
On the issue of boards’ size affecting service delivery; while 54 per cent belief the composition of the agencies 
boards is not moderate to guarantee service delivery, 22 per cent are undecided. Here, while some studies have 
shown that optimum size for a decision-making group to be seven people and for each person added above this, 
the group decision making effectiveness is reduced by 10% (Blenko, Mankins and Rogers), others found that the 
most effective number as five but noted that the most effective of the group decision making is between five and 
eight, (Margolis, 2011). 
While the survey revealed 31 per cent of respondents being undecided as to the agencies officials lack of 
knowledge of good governance awareness, 52 per cent belief officials have no knowledge of good governance 
awareness thereby affecting their mode of operations and therefore while 72 per cent belief the agencies do not 
operate in obedience to the rule of law, only 5 per cent think otherwise in the discharge of their responsibilities. 
This is in agreement with Unachukwu (2018) citing Chief Emeka Obegolu who in a lecture organized by the NBA 
Eket branch stated that the rule of law was a hall-mark of democracy and that there is a connection between 
democracy and good governance. This is also in line with the works of Ojiakor, Anisiuba & Nnam (2017) and 
Adegbie & Fakile (2012) that revealed poor governance, favoritism, tribalism, poor remuneration, ineffective and 
wrong judgements as factors mitigating the performance of the agencies. Olaniyan (2018) on anti-corruption fight 
and the rule of law, posited that part of the problem of fighting corruption is the authority’s disdain for the rule of 
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law as “illustrated by the tendency to pick and choose which court orders it complies with” and opined that real 
progress is yet to be made with respect to the prosecution of cases of grand corruption as high ranking corrupt 
officials rarely end up in jail. Therefor the assertion as to whether the managements of the agencies are loyal to 
the Constitution as against the President, majority of the respondents (99 per cent) disagreed to agencies officials’ 
loyalty to the Constitution as against the Presidency. This is in agreement to Adedokun (2018) who opined that 
the average public officer in Nigeria does not understand that “they owe their allegiance to the cause of the country 
because politics has become a major source of survival in Nigeria and so they defer to their appointer because of 
the power to hire and fire by the chief executive”. This is in agreement with (Olaniyan, 2018; Unachukwu, 2018; 
Jibueze, 2018B) 
On the effectiveness and credibility of the agencies performances, while the survey revealed 61 per cent 
respondents think the agencies have not performed to internationally acceptable standard, only 13 per cent think 
otherwise. This is in agreement with the judgement delivered in a case EFCC versus Prof. Olusola Oyewole where 
the presiding judge declared that all the evidence presented by the prosecution had been “manifestly discredited 
through cross-examination such that the court could not rely on them and thus declared that EFCC failed woefully 
in establishing a prima facie case against the accused persons”. Also in agreement with the report presented by the 
Corruption Cases Trial Monitoring Committee (COTRIMO) which stated that offenders were charged to court 
before proper investigation of charges was done and that prosecuting agencies “lacked adequate personnel, 
duplicate charges and multiplication of cases and while some prosecutors lacked the requisite experience to 
prosecute corruption cases there is lack of commitment and collusion between defense counsel and some 
prosecutors to pervert justice by either stalling trial or by achieving pre-determined results”, (Jibueze, 2018A). 
This study is in line with the studies of (Amaefule & Umeaka, 2016; Ojiakor, Anisiuba & Nnam, 2017 and Dania, 
2017) that opined that the activities of the anti-graft agencies are not effective in curbing corruption and financial 
crimes in Nigeria cases are lost due to lack of painstaking investigation, lack of adequate and requisite trained 
personnel and lack of strategic preparations. 
Table 2: Unit root test for stationarity of our data 
Variables ADF Statistics 5% Critical Value  Order of Integration 
LGGP -3.199640 -2.869605  I(0) 
LAPE -18.42064 -2.869629  I(1) 
LEPL -3.049782 -2.869605  I(0) 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from E-view 10, 2019 
The researcher subjected each of the variables to unit root test using ADF test to check for stationarity, this 
is because there is growing consensus about stationarity status of data used for research in order to determine the 
appropriate model to use for the study. Table 2 shows that not all the variables are stationary at levels I(0) i.e two 
of the variables are stationary at levels while the third one is stationary at their first difference I(1).  
From the results of the ADF unit root test, it was revealed that LGGP and LEPL were found to be stationary 
at levels while LAPE was found to be stationary at first difference. Based on this unit root test result, it implies 
that the appropriate statistical technique for data analysis for this study is Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
bounds test approach to cointegration proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) to estimate the above 
relationship. The ARDL approach offers some desirable statistical advantages over other cointegration techniques. 
While other co-integration techniques requires all the variables to be integrated of the same order, ARDL test 
procedure provides valid results whether the variables are I(0) or I(1) or mutually cointegrated and provides very 
efficient and consistent estimates in small and large sample sizes(Pesaran, Shin & Smith(2001).  
The ARDL can be specified as this if there is NO cointegration 
 ∆LG = 0 + ∑= 1 ∆LG− + ∑= 2 ∆LAPE− +  ∑= 3 ∆LEPL− + 1  
And as this if there is cointegration, the error correction model(ECM) representation is specified as 
∆LGGP = 0+ ∑= 1 ∆LGGP− + ∑= 2 ∆LAPE− +  ∑= 3 ∆LEPL− +   
1	
−1 +  1  
Where  
   ∆ = the difference operator.   
 = (1 -  ∑=,  d), Speed of adjustment parameter with a negative sign. 
A negative and significant ECMt-1 coefficient implies that any short term disequilibrium between the 
dependent and explanatory variables will converge back to the long-run equilibrium relationship.   
To validate the stability of the estimates, the CUSUM test were applied. Furthermore, the study applied the 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test to test whether or not the estimates of the model are interdependent. 
We also check for existence of causal relationship among our variables. 
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Table 3: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria    
Endogenous variables: LGGP     
Exogenous variables: C LAPE LEPL     
Date: 12/25/19   Time: 05:08    
Sample: 1 360     
Included observations: 346    
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  381.1436 NA   0.006580 -2.185801 -2.152450 -2.172521 
1  488.0225   211.2866*   0.003568*  -2.797818*  -2.753350*  -2.780111* 
2  488.5306  1.001669  0.003578 -2.794975 -2.739390 -2.772841 
3  489.8969  2.685115  0.003571 -2.797092 -2.730391 -2.770531 
4  489.9994  0.200796  0.003589 -2.791904 -2.714086 -2.760916 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion   
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 FPE: Final prediction error    
 AIC: Akaike information criterion    
 SC: Schwarz information criterion    
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion   
 
Table 4: Long Run ARDL Cointegration Analysis 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(LGGP)  
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 1, 1)  
Case 3: Unrestricted Constant and No Trend 
Date: 12/25/19   Time: 05:47  
Sample: 1 360   
Included observations: 349   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C 0.071522 0.032002 2.234927 0.0261 
LGGP(-1)* -0.107470 0.025255 -4.255403 0.0000 
LAPE(-1) 0.050309 0.015113 3.328784 0.0010 
LEPL(-1) 0.042933 0.014283 3.005830 0.0028 
D(LAPE) 0.513935 0.030651 16.76734 0.0000 
D(LEPL) 0.338792 0.044249 7.656443 0.0000 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     
   
Asymptotic: 
n=1000  
F-statistic  6.590805 10%   3.17 4.14 
K 2 5%   3.79 4.85 
  2.5%   4.41 5.52 
  1%   5.15 6.36 
Actual Sample Size 349  
Finite Sample: 
n=80  
  10%   3.26 4.247 
  5%   3.94 5.043 
  1%   5.407 6.783 
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t-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     t-statistic -4.255403 10%   -2.57 -3.21 
  5%   -2.86 -3.53 
  2.5%   -3.13 -3.8 
  1%   -3.43 -4.1 
     
      
Table 5: Outcome of the Bound test in table 4 above 
Dependent 
Variable 
F_Statistics Cointegration Whats Next 
LGGP F_Stats = 6.590805          
 t_Stats         = -4.2554031 
YES Estimate ECM(Error 
Correction Model) 
We therefore estimate the error correction model specification, using lag 1 selected as suggested in table 3 
above.  
We regress: D(LGGP) C D(LGGP(-1)) D(LAPE(-1)) D(LEPL(-1)) ECM(-1) to get our error correction model 
in table 5 below which shows both the short run long run dynamics of our model. 
Table 6: Error Correction Model Result 
Dependent Variable: D(LGGP)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/25/19   Time: 06:57  
Sample (adjusted): 3 350   
Included observations: 348 after adjustments 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.000148 0.004187 0.035277 0.9719 
D(LGGP(-1)) 0.982466 0.252361 3.893103 0.0001 
D(LAPE(-1)) 0.035676 0.084075 0.424340 0.6716 
D(LEPL(-1)) 0.001875 0.097853 0.019160 0.9847 
ECM(-1) -1.070777 0.246175 -4.349653 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.052437     Mean dependent var -0.002132 
Adjusted R-squared 0.041387     S.D. dependent var 0.079119 
S.E. of regression 0.077465     Akaike info criterion -2.263728 
Sum squared resid 2.058263     Schwarz criterion -2.208380 
Log likelihood 398.8886     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.241693 
F-statistic 4.745311     Durbin-Watson stat 2.015996 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000973    
     
          Source: Researcher’s Computation from E-views 10,.2019 
Log of D(LGGP(-)) is the only significant variable at less than 5percent. Our error correction term (ECM) is 
correctly signed (negative) and significant which implies that our model converges in the long run to equilibrium 
with a speed of adjustment of 107.07 percent. This means there exist a long run association ship running from 
D(LAPE(-1)) and DLEPL(-1)) to D(LGGP). 
This result shows that only 4.13 percent of total variation in good governance practices is explained by ant 
grafts agencies practices. Our F-Statistics of 4.745311 with Prob_value of 0.000972 shows that it is statistically 
significant at less than 5 per cent, implies that our model is well fitted.  
We check for serial correlation using Breuch -Godfrey Serial Correlation test as depicted below 
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Table 7: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM  Test: 
     
     F-statistic 6.714316     Prob. F(1,342) 0.0100 
Obs*R-squared 6.700563 
    Prob.     Chi-
Square(                                 1) 0.0096 
     
     Source: Researcher’s Computation from E-views 10,.2019 
From the result in table 6 above, the prob. Chi square is below 5 percent, it is 0.0001 percent, meaning that 
the null hypothesis, no serial correlation cannot be accepted. It therefore means that the model is not free from 
serial correlation.  
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Figure. 1: test for stability of our ECM model 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from E-views 10,.2019 
The figure1 above shows that our model lies between the 5% boundary and therefore means that our model 
is stable, 
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Figure. 2: Test for structural Breaks 
Source: Researcher’s Computation from E-views 10,.2019 
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Figure 2 shows that our model is suffering from some structural breaks since there are some deviations from 
the 5% boundary. 
Table 8:  Granger causality test 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 12/25/19   Time: 07:56 
Sample: 1 360  
Lags: 1   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     LAPE does not Granger Cause LGGP  349  7.00849 0.0085 
 LGGP does not Granger Cause LAPE  3.28612 0.0707 
    
     LEPL does not Granger Cause LGGP  349  0.14795 0.7007 
 LGGP does not Granger Cause LEPL  0.46699 0.4948 
    
     LEPL does not Granger Cause LAPE  349  2.14096 0.1443 
 LAPE does not Granger Cause LEPL  0.62200 0.4308 
    
    Source: Researcher’s Computation from E-views 10,.2019 
From this causality result above, there is a uni-directional causality between LAPE and LGGP. There is no 
causality among the other variables  
Table 9: Short term dynamics using Wald Test 
Variables Tested Null Hypothesis F-statistics Prob. Remark 
LAPE C (3) = 0 0.180065 0.6716 Accepted 
LEPL C (4) = 0 0.000367 0.9847 Accepted 
* Represents Rejection of Null hypothesis @ 5 % level 
Source: Eview 9.1 Computation, 2019. 
 
Test of Hypotheses 
H01: There is no significant relationship between anti-graft agencies    administrative/professional etiquette 
and good governance practices. 
H11: There is significant relationship between anti-graft agencies administrative/professional etiquette and 
good governance practices. 
 
Decision Rule 
Accept H0: if calculated f-statistics value < table f-statistics value.' 
Reject H0: if calculated f-statistics value > table f-statistics value. 
From the regression result, 
Calculated f-statistics value = 0.180065  
Table f-statistics value  = 3.00  
Since the calculated f-statistics value of 0.707 is less than the table f-statistics value of 3.00 at 5 percent level of 
significance, we accept the null hypothesis and reject the alternative hypothesis. It therefore implies that there is 
no significant relationship between anti-graft agencies administrative/professional etiquette and good governance 
practices. 
H02: There is no significant relationship between anti-graft agencies prosecution efficiencies/ obedience to the 
rule of law and good governance practices. 
H12: There is significant relationship between anti-graft agencies prosecution efficiencies/ obedience to the 
rule of law and good governance practices. 
 
Decision Rule 
Accept H0: if calculated f-statistics value < table f-statistics value.' 
Reject H0: if calculated f-statistics value > table f-statistics value. 
From the regression result, 
Calculated f-statistics value = 0.000367 
Table f-statistics value  = 3.00  
Since the calculated f-statistics value of 0.000367 is less than the table f-statistics value of 3.00 at 5 percent level 
of significance, we accept the null hypothesis and reject the alternative hypothesis. It therefore implies that there 
is no significant relationship between anti-graft agencies prosecution efficiencies/obedience to the rule of law and 
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good governance practices. 
H03: There is no significant causal relationship between anti-graft agencies prosecution efficiencies/ obedience 
to the rule of law and their administrative/professional etiquette and good governance practices. 
H13: There is a significant causal relationship between anti-graft agencies prosecution efficiencies/ obedience 
to the rule of law and their administrative/professional etiquette and good governance practices. 
 
Decision Rule: Accept Ho, if there is no causality among the variables at all, otherwise reject H0. 
From our Granger causality table result in table 7, there is a uni-directional causality running from LAPE to LGGP. 
This means that, the null hypothesis cannot be accepted. It therefore implies there exist causal relationship among 
the variables under consideration even though uni- directional and weak. This reaffirms the study of Ewa, Adebisi 
& Kankpang (2019). 
 
5.Conclusion/recommendation 
The study revealed among others  
i. There is a long run relationship among the variables under study 
ii. There is no significant relationship in the short run between administrative/Professional etiquette 
practices (LAPE) and good governance (LGGP) in Nigeria. 
iii. There is no significant short run relationship between efficiency on prosecution and obedience to the 
rule of law (LEPL) and good governance (LGGP) in Nigeria. 
iv. There is a uni-directional causality from administrative/professional etiquette practices (LAPE) to 
good governance (LGGP) in Nigeria. 
This result of the study further revealed lack of capacity, inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the discharge of 
their responsibilities as well as unresponsiveness to the general public, transparency deficiency and outright 
disobedience to the rule of law as well as unequal treatment of accused citizenry. Also, the study further revealed 
that the agencies boards’ composition affects their level of efficiency and effectiveness. This result is in agreement 
with the study by Ewa, Adebisi & Kankpang (2019). 
The study thus recommends, the review of the extant laws establishing the agencies to make them independent 
from the executive arm of government as well as improved funding, training and retraining of field staff of the 
agencies to sharpen their investigative skills and prosecution efficiency. 
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